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Abstract
Bitcoin is based on a P2P network that is used to propagate transactions and blocks
of the blockchain. While the P2P network design intends to hide the topology of the P2P
network to impede adversarial actions against peers, information about the topology
is required to understand the network from a scientific point of view, to build realis-
tic models used for simulations, and to use these models to optimize protocols of the
P2P networks. Thus, there is a natural tension between the ‘desire’ for unobservability
on the one hand, and for observability on the other hand. On a middle ground, one
would at least be interested on some statistical features of the Bitcoin network like the
number of peers that participate in the propagation of transactions and blocks. This
number is composed of the number of reachable peers that accept incoming connections
and unreachable peers that do not accept incoming connections. Despite not accepting
incoming connections, unreachable peers open several outgoing connections to other
peers and participate in the propagation of transactions and blocks. While the number
of reachable peers can be measured, it is inherently difficult to determine the number
of unreachable peers, exactly because one cannot connect to them. Thus, the number
of unreachable peers can only be estimated based on some indicators. In this paper, we
first define our understanding of unreachable peers and then propose the PAL (Passive
Announcement Listening) method which gives an estimate of the number of unreachable
peers by observing addr messages that announce active IP addresses in the network.
The PAL method allows for detecting unreachable peers that use flags to indicate that
they provide services useful to the P2P network. In conjunction with previous methods,
the PAL method can help to get a better estimate of the number of unreachable peers.
We use the PAL method to analyze data from a long-term measurement of the Bitcoin
P2P network that gives insights into the development of the number of unreachable
peers over more than five years from 2015 to 2020. Results show that about 31,000 un-
reachable peers providing useful services were active per day at the end of the year 2020.
An empirical validation indicates that the approach finds about 50 % of the unreachable
peers that provide useful services.
1 Introduction
In Bitcoin [9], transactions and blocks are propagated by peers that are connected in a
peer-to-peer (P2P) network. The protocol used for the propagation of transactions and
blocks affects the whole system’s performance security: The propagation delay of blocks is
connected to the number of forks, i.e. temporal inconsistencies in the blockchain [2]. The
protocol’s bandwidth consumption limits the maximum number of connections [10] which
limits the resilience against eclipse attacks [7]. The protocol can also leak information about
the creator of a transaction [4] and partial information about the topology of the network
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[11, 6, 3]. Analyzing the protocol with regard to these aspects and validating proposals for
improvements can hardly be done in the live P2P network. Thus, researchers and developers
use simulations of the P2P network for these tasks [12, 10]. Such simulations require a model
of the topology of the P2P network. However, the real topology of the Bitcoin P2P network
is unknown to the public1 because the protocol is designed to hide information about the
topology that could support adversarial actions against peers [4, 7]. Therefore, simulations
model the topology based on certain characteristics that can be measured or estimated
without having a method for the measurement built into the protocol itself. One of these
characteristics and the object of this paper is the number of peers that participate in the
propagation of transactions and blocks.
To form the P2P network, each peer creates by default 10 outgoing connections to other
peers. A peer is a running instance of a Bitcoin software that is connected to at least one
other instance of a Bitcoin software. Peers are encouraged to connect to multiple peers to
reduce chances of being victim of an eclipse attack [7]. Not every peer accepts incoming
connections, e.g., because a peer is behind a NAT or a firewall or a peer is configured to
block incoming connections. Thus, the peers can be categorized into two groups: reachable
peers that accept incoming connections and unreachable peers that do not accept incoming
connections. Despite the name, unreachable peers play an active role in the P2P network.
While unreachable peers do not accept incoming connections, they open several outgoing
connections to other peers and participate in the propagation of transactions and blocks
just as reachable peers do. Hence, for the propagation of transactions and blocks both, the
reachable and unreachable peers are relevant. Franzoni and Daza [5] recently presented how
the robustness and efficiency of the P2P network can be improved by giving unreachable
peers a special role in the propagation of transactions.
There exist projects2 continuously measuring the number of reachable peers. However,
unreachable peers are mostly invisible because one cannot connect to them. Although we
can define the set of unreachable peers, we cannot retrieve it using measurements: We can
only estimate the number of unreachable peers. There are two ways to get such an estimate:
The first way is to observe a fraction of unreachable peers and extrapolate the whole number
of unreachable peers. This can be done by running a reachable peer that accepts incoming
connections from unreachable peers. The second way is to observe effects that are caused
by unreachable peers and infer their number from these observations. In this paper, we
present an approach that uses the second way to estimate the number of unreachable peers.
This approach, that we call the PAL (Passive Announcement Listening) method, relies on
observing address announcements that are forwarded by reachable peers in the network.
The approach is only able to count unreachable peers that offer services to the network
such as storing the latest 288 blocks of the blockchain. Addresses of unreachable peers that
do not announce such useful services will not be forwarded by other peers and thus not be
counted. As there is no ground truth available, we validate our approach by verifying our
assumptions and by comparing the results of our approach to an observation of a fraction of
unreachable peers. We show that the approach detects most reachable peers and about 50 %
of unreachable peers that provide useful services. Previous work has estimated the number
of unreachable peers to be around 16,000 peers [11], 54,000 peers [10], 100,000 peers [1], and
155,000 peers [15]. The wide range of differences comes not only from different measuring
times and methods but also from the fact that different definitions of the term unreachable
peer are used.
1Approaches to gain (partial) information about the topology have been proposed [1, 8, 11, 6, 3]. However,
they either do not work anymore or require a strong attacker to get the complete P2P network’s topology.
2E.g., https://bitnodes.io/ and https://dsn.kastel.kit.edu/bitcoin/
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Thus, we start by defining the term unreachable peers and other relevant terms in the
following section. An overview of related work will be given in Section 3. We describe the
Bitcoin protocol and the behavior of the most common Bitcoin implementation in Section 4.
Then, we present the PAL method in Section 5 and present the results of applying the
method to data collected from the Bitcoin P2P network between 2015 and 2020. We validate
the method in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Definitions and Problem Statement
We refer to an implementation of the Bitcoin protocol as Bitcoin software. As stated above,
we define a peer as a running instance of a Bitcoin software that is connected to at least
one other running instance of a Bitcoin software. We expect most peers, however, to be
connected to multiple peers in order to reduce chances of being a victim of an eclipse
attack. A Bitcoin P2P network consists of peers that are directly or indirectly connected
to each other. Because this definition allows multiple Bitcoin P2P networks, we refer to the
Bitcoin P2P network as the Bitcoin P2P network that includes the peers that mine blocks
with more computation power than the peers in every other Bitcoin P2P network. In the
following, we consider only peers that are part of the Bitcoin P2P network.
Categorizing peers into reachable and unreachable peers is more difficult than it might
seem at a first glance. A first approach would be to define a peer as unreachable if all
other peers cannot initiate a connection to that peer. A peer might be unreachable because
it runs behind a firewall that blocks incoming connections. However, a peer might accept
incoming connections from one group of peers but refuse incoming connections from other
peers. Imagine a private network that blocks incoming connections from the outside to peers
inside the network but allows for incoming connections between peers that are inside the
private network (see Fig. 1a). Because a peer in such a network would accept incoming
connections from some peers, this peer would not be called unreachable following the above
definition of unreachable. However, this peer would be unreachable for all peers outside the
private network and, thus, should by intuition be categorized as unreachable. Therefore,
a definition of unreachable peers may not be too strict. We consider such cases in the
following definition that we use in this paper: A peer p is called unreachable if the majority
of other peers cannot initiate a connection to p. This means that a peer is called reachable
if most other peers can initiate a connection to that peer. Note that, if the majority of
peers were inside a private network that blocks connections from the outside but allows for
internal connections, this definition would categorize the peers in this private network as
reachable (see Fig. 1b) because the majority of other peers is in the same private network.
Indeed, the peers in this private network might have many incoming connections and, thus,
look like reachable peers. However, as peers outside the private network cannot initiate a
connection to them, the peers in the private network would seem unreachable to the rest of
the world. We think that a binary classification into reachable and unreachable peers would
not be suitable for such a scenario. For this work, however, we assume that the Bitcoin P2P
network follows mostly the model as sketched in Fig. 1a, i.e. most peers in the Bitcoin P2P
network accept incoming connections from either all other peers or none.
Our goal is to estimate the number of unreachable peers. Because peers join and leave
the network (churn) this number changes continuously. The number of peers at a given
point in time can be different from the number of peers that existed during a given time
period (e.g., during one day). In the following, we will talk about estimating the number of
unreachable peers during time periods. Using a model for churn, this number can be used















Set of peers A. Size corresponds to cardinality.
Each peer in A can initiate a connection to each peer in B.
Figure 1: Two simple models of how the peers in the Bitcoin P2P network might be con-
nected. a) Each unreachable peer can initiate a connection to each reachable peer. A reach-
able peer can initiate a connection to another reachable peer. Additionally, there might
be a private network of unreachable peers that can connect to each other. b) The number
of peers in the private network might exceed the number of other peers. In this case, our
definition would classify the peers in the private network as reachable peers although they
are not reachable by peers outside the private network. This is not a problem for this work
because we assume that the Bitcoin P2P network looks similar to the model a).
The peers in the Bitcoin P2P network are identified by their addresses. A peer can have
multiple addresses (in the most common case an IPv4 address and an IPv6 address) and
multiple peers can share an address (e.g., an IPv4 address because they are behind the same
NAT). In this work, we will make the simplifying assumption that each peer has exactly
one address. If we simply use the term address, then it refers to any type of address being
used in the Bitcoin protocol, e.g., IPv4 address, IPv6 address, or Tor address (see BIP 1553
for full list).
3 Related Work
The number of reachable peers is continuously measured by different projects (see Footnote 2
on page 2). They share the basic approach of recursively searching the network for peers.
Exemplary, we explain the approach of Bitnodes4 which is similar to that of [13]: The
software starts with an initial set of peers, connects to each peer and requests addresses
from this peer using a getaddr message. On receiving an addr message as reply, the
software tries to connect to each of the addresses in the reply and, for each successfully
opened connection, addresses are requested over this new connection. The set of peers that
a connection has been established to, is regarded as the set of reachable peers. In case a
connection to an address cannot be established, it is unknown whether there is no peer at
this address or there is an unreachable peer at this address. Therefore, this approach is not
capable of measuring the number of unreachable peers.
In previous work, only few attempts have been made to estimate the number of unreach-




Table 1: Messages of the Bitcoin protocol relevant for our study
Type Relevant Fields
version protocol version, services, user agent, address of receiving peer, . . .
verack –
getaddr –
addr number of entries, for each entry: timestamp, services, address, port
different data centers around the globe for seven days and logged all incoming connections
and associated information. For each peer that connected to one of the probes, they tried
to open a TCP connection on port 8333 to that peer’s IP address and to open a connection
via the Bitcoin protocol. They observed on average about 10,000 unique IP addresses in a
6-hours interval. They assume an average of 3.5 connections per unreachable peer and 5,540
reachable peers and use these numbers to estimate that there were at least 155,000 un-
reachable peers in each 6-hours interval. The authors measured that 34.6 % of the observed
connections lasted shorter than one second and 93.9 % lasted shorter than one minute.
To parameterize their simulation, Naumenko et al. [10] used numbers obtained from
a website run by Luke-Jr5. They obtained the information that the network had 54,000
unreachable peers (called non-listening) and 6,000 reachable peers (called listening). At the
time of writing (January 2021), the website lists about 50,000 unreachable peers and 5,000
reachable peers. The methodology behind the website is not publicly documented, but, in
the absence of other reference points, we also compare our measurements to the numbers
obtained from this website.
4 Bitcoin Peers
The protocol for peers in the Bitcoin P2P network is described by a public developer
reference6. The protocol does not distinguish between reachable and unreachable peers
because a peer cannot detect whether it is unreachable or is reachable but does not have
any incoming connections, yet. Because most of the peers run the same software, Bitcoin
Core (announced in version messages as ”Satoshi”),7 the behavior of this software is the
de facto specification of the protocol. In the following, we start by describing the protocol
rules that all peers should follow and then describe the relevant behavior of Bitcoin Core
in more detail.
4.1 Bitcoin Protocol
Table 1 gives an overview of the messages in the Bitcoin protocol relevant for this paper. We
briefly explain these messages in this paragraph. Peers need to know the addresses of other
peers to be able to connect to them. To this end, addresses are propagated in the Bitcoin
P2P network using addr messages. An addr message consists of a header, the number of
entries that follow, and one or multiple entries. Each entry consists of an address, a port,
a timestamp, and service flags. The timestamp was originally meant to describe when that





leak which peers are currently connected [8]. The service flags describe the services offered
and extensions implemented by the peer running at the address. The protocol allows addr
messages to contain up to 1000 entries. addr messages can be sent unsolicited and they
can be requested using a getaddr message. A peer replies to a getaddr message with an
addr message.
When a connection between two peers is established, they send version messages to
each other that contain the peers’ user agents and services. The receiving peer replies to a
version message by sending a verack message.
4.2 Bitcoin Reference Software
By default, Bitcoin Core opens eight outgoing connections for full-relay and two outgoing
connections that are used only for relaying blocks but not for transactions and addresses.
Thus, an unreachable peer maintains outgoing connections to ten other peers. A reachable
peer can additionally have incoming connections. The default maximum number of all (out-
going and incoming) connections is 125. In case a new incoming connection fills the last
available slot, Bitcoin Core will evict an existing connection based on different metrics such
as duration of the connection, ping times, and amount of transmitted data.
Peers request addresses from other peers using the getaddr message which is answered
by an addr message. The reply contains at most 23 % of the addresses in the replying peers
database and at most 1000 addresses. addr messages are also sent unsolicitedly: A peer
announces its address to a connected peer once a connection has been established. Each
peer also regularly announces its address to its connected peers (except those for block-relay
only). The announcements are sent at random times following an exponential distribution
with a mean of 24 hours. In contrast to replies to a getaddr message, these announcements
are forwarded so that peers in the network learn about other peers. To distinguish between
forwarded announcements and an announcement of a peer’s own address, we call the later
a self announcement.
To tell whether an addr message was received unsolicitedly or in reply to a getaddr
message, Bitcoin Core checks the number of entries in an addr message. Because an-
nouncements of addresses are unsolicited, most of the messages with announcements are
small messages with ten or less entries. Thus, Bitcoin Core considers the addresses in an
addr message for propagation if the addr message contains ten or less entries. An address
is only propagated if it meets the following requirements: (1) The service flags associated
with the address need to have the node witness flag set and the node network or
node network limited flags. (2) The timestamp associated with the address must not
be older than ten minutes. (3) The address itself must be routable, i.e., it may not be from
an IP address range that is reserved for private use. If the decision is for an address to be
propagated, then it is sent to one or two connected peers.
5 PAL Method and Results
In this section, we present the PAL method and give details on the setup and data collection
and the methodology for analyzing the data. We discuss the limitations of this approach
and present the results of applying this method to data collected during a timespan of five
years.
For the PAL method, we run a passive monitor node that is connected to all reachable
peers. The monitor collects unsolicitedly sent addr messages that are received from its





Figure 2: Overview of the setup. The monitor node is connected to all reachable peers.
Unreachable peers are connected to reachable peers, too. There are connections between
reachable peers but no connections between unreachable peers.
peers during this day. After removing the addresses of reachable peers from this set, we
have an estimate of the set of unreachable peers.
The PAL method can be seen as a refinement on the approach for finding reachable
peers explained at the beginning of Section 3. This approach itself is unsuitable for reliably
finding unreachable peers because it only reveals that there are reachable peers at addresses
at which an incoming connection is accepted. If no incoming connection is accepted at an
address, the approach does not allow to draw any conclusions on whether there is no peer
or an unreachable peer at this address. Instead of relying on getaddr messages to quickly
collect many addresses, we use a passive monitor node that waits for unsolicited addr
messages. An address is only sent unsolicitedly if it is forwarded or if the sending peer
announces this address as its own address (self announcement). If we receive an address in
an unsolicited addr message at the monitor, we can conclude that at most ten minutes
ago there was a peer at this address because these messages are only propagated until the
timestamp associated with the address is older than ten minutes. Collecting all unsolicitedly
sent addresses during one day gives us an estimate of the set of peers during this day. By
filtering out reachable peers, we receive an estimate of the set of unreachable peers for this
day.
Data Collection We run a monitor node that connects to all known reachable peers in
the network (see Fig. 2). The monitor is mostly passive, i.e. it does not send any messages
with the following exceptions:
• After opening a connection, the monitor sends its own identifier in a version message
• After having received another peer’s version message, the monitor not only sends a
verack message but also requests addresses by sending a getaddr message.
• Every two minutes, the monitor sends a getaddr message to a uniform randomly
chosen peer.
Sending the getaddr messages is not required for the PAL method but also does not
interfere with our results; the addr messages that are received in reply to these messages
will be ignored in the following. The monitor tries to connect to each address it receives
in addr messages (rate-limited per address to once every six hours). The monitor logs all
received addr messages, version messages and the time when a connection to another
peer is established or closed.
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Table 2: Overview of notation (also see Fig. 3)
Symbol Description
At Set of addresses received on day t in small addr messages (senders excluded)
Pt Set of addresses that the monitor node was connected to on day t
Ut (Estimation of) Set of addresses of unreachable peers on day t
All ADDR messages 
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Figure 3: Data flow of the PAL method and the approach of [15] to estimate the number
of reachable and unreachable peers in the Bitcoin P2P network. The sets Mt and It are
collected during measurements and the arrows show filters and operations to derive more
specific sets during the analysis. The border color of each box indicates whether the respec-
tive set contains peers with useful services only or also those without. The background color
of each box indicates whether the respective set includes reachable and unreachable peers.
Data Analysis We analyze the logs created by the monitor with the goal of learning the
number of peers in the network. We describe this process in the following and depict it in
the upper part of Fig. 3. The most relevant notation symbols are listed in Table 2. For each
day t, we collect all addresses that were received by the monitor (see Mt in Fig. 3). We
define the set At by applying the following two filters on these addresses: (1) We select only
the addresses in small addr messages (we define small for addr messages as containing
ten or less entries). (2) We ignore the self announcements of (reachable) peers, i.e. entries
of an addr message that equal the address of the sender of this addr message. The set At
includes addresses of reachable and unreachable peers that were announced on this day. We
determine the set Pt of all addresses that the monitor node was connected to on day t. For
this, we collect all addresses that the monitor already was connected to at the beginning
of day t or a connection was established and a version message received during day t. We
consider this set Pt as the set of all reachable peers at day t. Our estimate of the unreachable
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Figure 4: Number of unique addresses observed in small addr messages per day. Note that
the upper part uses a different scale than the lower part.
Limitations As described in Section 4, peers running Bitcoin Core only forward addresses
that have specific flags set (node witness and (node network or node network -
limited)). Thus, we do not expect to receive addresses of peers that do not have these flags
set at the monitor node. The PAL method can only detect such peers with useful services
which is indicated by the border colors in Fig. 3.
Another limitation of the PAL method is that it cannot distinguish whether an unreach-
able peer existed only for a short moment on a day or the whole day. Also, the addresses and
associated information in addr messages are not authenticated. Thus, a peer can send any
address and information about this address to other peers in the network. If a peer sends
addresses in an addr message, there is no proof that the peer has received the address from
another peer or is connected to a peer with this address. Therefore, the approach can be
disturbed by flooding the network with bogus addresses.
Measurements We applied the method to data collected from 2015 to 2020 and present
the results here. Figure 4 shows |At|, the number of unique addresses received in small
messages for each day t and the number |Ut| of addresses that were unreachable. The plot
shows that, at the majority of days in the observation range, between 20,000 and 60,000
unique addresses were received in small messages. Most noticeably, the plot shows a high
amount of addresses at the end of the year 2018 and beginning of the year 2019 which
we will discuss later. The remaining plot shows that the number of addresses increased
from the beginning of the year 2017 on to a maximum of about 72,000 addresses in the
middle of December 2017. From this point on, the number of addresses declined slowly until
the prominent peaks around the turn of the year 2018/2019 and since then the number
of addresses has been relatively stable around 37,000. The number of unreachable peers
|Ut| has a similar development but is consistently about 28 % lower than the number of all
addresses. At the end of the year 2020, the number of unreachable peers |Ut| equals about
31,000 peers.
The peak at the end of the year 2018 seems like many unreachable peers joined the
network within a few days. An alternative explanation would be that bogus addresses were
distributed that do not actually belong to peers. We examined the addresses that were
received only during this time and did not find any irregularities with regard to their
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Figure 5: Number of unique addresses of reachable peers observed in small addr messages
per day.
However, for the highest peak in March 2019, we found that this peak was caused by many
IP addresses from the same /8 subnet. As IP addresses from this subnet were only very
rarely observed before and after March 2019, we assume that this effect was caused by
unknown actions of one party that flooded the network with these IP addresses. It is an
open question whether a known or unknown attack would cause such effects and whether
this can be verified using the data from our measurements.
6 Validation
To validate the PAL method, in this section we analyze the measured data and compare it
to other sources.
6.1 Reachable Peers
As a first step, we verify that the results of the PAL method are consistent in itself. If
our assumptions hold true, we should be able to find all reachable peers in small addr
messages during each day. As we know the set of reachable peers, we can use it to evaluate
the precision of our measurements. Putting this into the context of Fig. 3, this means that,
if the PAL method works perfectly, we expect that set Rt equals set Pt.
In Fig. 5, we plot the number |Pt| of reachable peers for each day t and the number
|At ∩ Pt| = |Rt| of reachable peers whose addresses we received on each day t. The plot
shows that since July 01, 2016 on each day on average 91.4 % of the addresses of reachable
peers were received in a small addr message on the same day (excluding events for peers
sending their own address). Over the time, the quality has increased: Since Jan 01, 2017 the
average is 93.4 % and since Jan 01, 2020 the average is 95.3 %. This is a promising result
as it indicates that reachable peers are consistently found by the PAL method. However, as
can be seen in Fig. 3, we do not have an independent ground-truth for the set of reachable
peers. Because all these sets of peers are based on the contents of addr messages, we can
only conclude that the PAL method’s constraint of looking at one day only and at small
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Figure 6: Stacked plot of the number of unique addresses observed in small addr messages
per day at two monitors. The plot is separated into the number of addresses received only
at monitor 1 (purple), the number of addresses received at both monitors (green), and the
number of addresses received only at monitor 2 (blue). It can be seen that the majority of
















Ratio of IPs seen at monitor 1 that were also seen by monitor 2 (in %, left axis)
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Figure 7: Ratio of IPs seen at monitor 1 that were also seen at monitor 2. The green plot
shows the number of unique addresses observed in small addr messages per day at both
monitors (right y-axis). The green plot is the same as the green plot in Fig. 6.
6.2 Second Monitor
For further validation, we run a second monitor node with the same method as describe
above. We compare the addresses received by two monitor nodes. If the measurement
method is reproducible, the data of both monitors should largely overlap. Figure 6 and
Fig. 7 show the results for two monitor nodes for the whole time of measurement. It can be
seen that since the beginning of 2017, over 95 % of the addresses observed at monitor 1 are
also observed at monitor 2. This indicates that the measurement is reproducible and that
the view of our monitor node is not subjective to the specific instance of the monitor.
6.3 Unreachable Peer
If our assumptions hold true, we can expect an unreachable peer that runs continuously
to be visible in small addr messages every day. We run a small experiment to test this
hypothesis. We start an unreachable peer pU running the Bitcoin Core software in version
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v0.20.1 with the only modification to create a log entry when the peer announces its own
address. The peer pU has an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. The log entry consists of a times-
tamp, which address is announced, and which peer the address is announced to. The peer
pU runs continuously and it is unreachable because its incoming TCP port 8333 is blocked
by a firewall. After being started, pU creates ten outgoing connections (eight for full-relay
and two for block-relay only). After the peer has been continuously running for 44 days,
we analyze the logs and compare them to our monitoring logs. We first look at the number
of announcements that the peer pU has sent on each day. While one might expect that pU
sends on average eight announcements per day because it announces its address to every
connected full-relay peer on average every 24 hours, the average measured is about 16. This
is because although the peer pU is running continuously, connections are closed by other
peers and pU creates new outgoing connections on which pU announces its address. The
number of announcements sent on a day is composed of the announcements on newly cre-
ated connections and regular announcements on existing connections. This fact increases
our expectations to receive an address of pU at the monitor on every day. Next, we exam-
ine this proposition by looking for pU’s addresses in the monitor’s logs. We find that the
monitor received pU’s address on 43 of the 44 days. Assuming that this observation can be
generalized, this indicates that the monitor sees the addresses of continuously running peers
running the Bitcoin Core software with high probability on each day and the PAL method
can detect these peers. We leave validation of this hypothesis for other Bitcoin software for
future work.
6.4 Validation with Incoming Connections at a Public Peer
The approach of [15] is to run many public peers that accept incoming connections and
observe the connections they receive which are partially from unreachable peers. For further
validation of the PAL method, we use a similar approach and run a single public peer pI
that accepts incoming connections. We compare the collected data to the data found in
addr messages to find out how many unreachable peers seen by pI are also found using the
PAL method.
The peer pI does not open outgoing connections
8 and logs for each connection when it
is established and closed and the received version messages. We analyze the logs after pI
has been running for about 16 months. On average, the peer pI had incoming connections
from about 2,040 different addresses per day (this corresponds to the size of It in Fig. 3).
As addr messages contain almost only addresses of peers providing useful services, we
only select such addresses for comparison. The resulting set per day contains on average
about 946 addresses (this corresponds to |St| in Fig. 3). The intersection of this set with all
addresses received in small addr messages on the same day, results in the set of addresses
that opened a connection to pI, announced useful services, and were observed in a small
addr on the same day (see Ht in Fig. 3). If the PAL method worked perfectly, than this
set Ht would equal the set St in Fig. 3. We find that on average 68 % of the addresses of
incoming connections with useful services were also observed in small addr messages on
the same day. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the set Ht contains reachable and unreachable peers.
To validate the detection of unreachable peers only, we reduce this set to unreachable peers
only by subtracting the set of reachable peers Pt. This shows that about 51 % of incoming
connections of unreachable peers are detected by the PAL method in small addr messages.
Analogously, we find that the PAL method detects about 98 % of incoming connections of
reachable peers.
8Before the experiment, a peer existed that had the same address as pI and initiated outgoing connections.
Therefore, pI’s address is contained in other peer’s databases and peers open incoming connections to pI.
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These results show that the PAL method is very reliable to detect reachable peers and it
detects about half of the unreachable peers with useful services. It is an open question why
unreachable peers are not detected as reliably as reachable peers. Possible explanations
could be that unreachable peers exist in the network for a shorter time than reachable
peers, that unreachable peers use different software with a different behavior, or that they
propagate an address that is different from the address they use for connections.
6.5 Comparison to Previous Measurements
As there is no ground truth that we could compare the data from the PAL method to,
we compare it to measurements created by previous works. In 2014, Biryukov et al. [1]
estimated that the Bitcoin P2P network had a size of 100,000 peers of which 90 % were
estimated to be unreachable. This estimation is too early to be compared to our data but,
taking the unreachable peers without useful services into account, this estimation could fit
in with our observations. Neudecker et al. [11] simulated the Bitcoin P2P network in 2016
and estimated from the simulated propagation behavior that the P2P network had about
16,000 unreachable peers that participate in the propagation of transactions and blocks.
The PAL method calculates about 14,000 unreachable peers per day averaged over the year
2016. As the results of [11] are given for one point in time and the PAL method estimates the
number of unreachable peers during one day, we would rather expect that the PAL method
would find more unreachable peers than [11]. Our explanation is that the lower number of
unreachable peers detected might again be caused by peers not announcing useful services
or by the effects mentioned at the end of Section 6.4.
A measurement of unreachable peers was conducted by Wang and Pustogarov in 2017
[15]. They ran more than 100 reachable peers to get incoming connections. From their
measurements, they estimated at least 155,000 unreachable peers to be active in each 6-hours
time period. This estimate is higher than the results obtained through the PAL method.
An explanation for this is that Wang and Pustogarov report that 80 % of unreachable peers
were mobile peers that had only short-lived connections. We assume that these peers either
did not announce their IP addresses or that they did not provide useful services. In this
case, they would be invisible to the PAL method which explains the difference to our results.
The measurement by Luke-Jr9 gives an estimate of the number of reachable and un-
reachable peers over a similar timespan. In Fig. 8 we plot our data and the data from
Luke-Jr in one plot for comparison. It can be seen that the number of unreachable peers
in the data from Luke-Jr is higher compared to the number of addresses in small messages
which is probably accounted for by the restriction that only addresses of peers providing
useful services are propagated. The increase in addresses in small messages at the end of
the year 2018 cannot be seen in the data from Luke-Jr which indicates that these peaks are
not caused by many peers joining the network during this time. However, it seems that this
period has had an effect on the measurements by Luke-Jr, too, because once the number of
addresses in small messages had declined in March 2019, the number of unreachable peers as
measured by Luke-Jr starts to rise. One interpretation of this fact is that the high number
of addr messages at this time, hid unreachable peers from Luke-Jr’s methodology and they
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Figure 8: Comparison between the number of addresses observed in small addr messages
per day and the data obtained from the website run by Luke-Jr.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the PAL method to estimate the number of peers in the Bitcoin P2P
network including unreachable peers. The PAL method adds a further reference point to
existing approaches measuring the number of unreachable peers. The estimate of the number
of unreachable peers at the end of 2020 is about 31,000 peers which, as indicated by our
validation, might correspond to about 50 % of all peers providing useful services. Looking at
the measurements of the past five years, we have seen that the number of peers varied. As
previous work considered only shorter time intervals, their measurements might have been
during a time when the number of peers was higher than today. The insights gained from
this work can be valuable for development and parameterization of simulators that model
the Bitcoin P2P network more realistically.
To further improve on the PAL method and the validation, we plan to simulate the
propagation of addr messages. We expect that this can enhance our understanding of the
method and of effects that are visible in the measurements.
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